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NOTES
LATENT DEFECTS: SUBSEQUENT
HOME PURCHASERS BEWARE
I. INTRODUCTION
Sharing a single bedroom apartment with their new-born
son's well-developed lungs convinced Mr. and Mrs. Subsequent
Homebuyer that it was time to purchase their first home. Not
only would it be nice to have more living space and a yard for
Junior, a home also would be a great investment.
As soon as the Homebuyers discussed the matter, they con-
tacted their local real estate agent. They discussed the location,
their budget, and the type of home that they wanted to
purchase. Two months and twelve open houses later, the young
couple found their dream home, a ranch-style house located in
the prestigious Sinking Sands subdivision.
Although it cost a little more than the Homebuyers wanted
to pay, the house was perfect. It was in a good school district,
had a nice yard, and fortunately, it was only one year old. The
prior owners, Mr. and Mrs. Glad Wesoldit, hated to sell, but
they had no choice because Mrs. Wesoldit's promotion required
them to move to anoth6r city. The Homebuyer's real estate
agent told them the home was built by Mr. Homebuilder, a rep-
utable residential builder, and that the Wesoldits purchased it
from Vendors Incorporated, the developer of Sinking Sands.
After the Homebuyers bought the house, they spent their
weekends decorating, working in the yard, and best of all, sleep-
ing. A year of peaceful home ownership, however, was soon to
end. As the house settled, small cracks began to appear in the
walls of their bedroom. At first, they were able to cover these
cracks with paint; however, the cracks eventually became too
large merely to paint over. To their horror, they soon discovered
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cracks in their patio and brick walls. The Homebuyers realized
that if nothing were done, they soon would be living in a subter-
ranean tomb. In desperation, they contacted the attorney they
had seen in a recent television commercial.
The Homebuyers frantically explained their problem to Mr.
T.V. Lawyer. He assured them that although the law of caveat
emptor (buyer beware) predominated in the United States until
the 1950s,' today many remedies were available to them. Listen-
ing attentively, the anxious Homebuyers were calmed by the le-
gal jargon. Mr. T.V. Lawyer explained that they may be able to
recover their damages from a number of persons under a variety
of legal theories. The builder, vendor, prior owner, real estate
agent, and possibly the lender could be liable for their damages.
Despite Mr. T.V. Lawyer's assurances, however, does the law re-
ally protect subsequent home purchasers? The Homebuyers
qualify as "subsequent purchasers" because they bought their
home from the Wesoldits rather than from the original vendor,
Vendors Incorporated.
This Note explores the remedies available to subsequent
home purchasers. Focusing on South Carolina law, it also exam-
ines the problem of finding a solvent party. Research reveals
that the courts have attempted to abolish caveat emptor by re-
lying on contract and tort theories, which are correspondingly
limited by the requirements of privity, foreseeability, and the ec-
onomic loss rule. Consequently, courts fashion remedies imper-
fectly and often inadequately to handle the myriad of problems
unique to home purchasers.
Conclusions drawn from this Note's analysis suggest that
caveat emptor still exists for many subsequent home purchasers
and that legislation is needed to remedy this inequity that often
denies recovery merely because of the unfortunate intervention
of a prior owner. As one possible solution, this Note proposes a
mandatory home warranty program, which would protect new
and subsequent home purchasers for a designated period of
time. Additionally, this program would require residential build-
ers to purchase transferable home warranty insurance, thus as-
suring aggrieved home buyers a solvent source of recovery.
1. See Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Merchant
Did It, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 835 (1967); Shedd, The Implied Warranty of Habitability: New
Implications, New Applications, 8 REAL EST. L.J 291, 292-93 (1980).
1018 [Vol. 40
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II. POSSMLE SOURCES OF RECOVERY
A. Builder- Vendors: Implied Warranty
The majority of jurisdictions recognize that new home pur-
chasers may maintain an implied warranty action against
builder-vendors.2 "Builder-vendor" has been defined as "one
who buys land and builds homes upon that land for purposes of
sale to the general public."3 Although a few states have enacted
statutes establishing this cause of action,4 in the majority of
states, including South Carolina, courts have created this rem-
edy judicially.' Only Georgia continues to deny an implied war-
ranty cause of action.' As a general rule, however, courts deny
recovery if a reasonable inspection by subsequent home purchas-
ers would have revealed any latent defects.7
Although states overwhelmingly recognize that an implied
warranty arises from the sale of new homes, the courts are di-
vided on whether this warranty extends to subsequent purchas-
ers who are not in privity with builder-vendors." In Terlinde v.
2. See Grand, Implied and Statutory Warranties in the Sale of Real Estate: The
Demise of Caveat Emptor, 15 REAL EsT. L.J. 44, 45-46 (1986); see also Annotation, Lia-
bility of Builder-Vendor or Other Vendor of New Dwelling for Loss, Injury, or Damage
Occasioned by Defective Condition Thereof, 25 A.L.R.3D 383, 413 (1969 & Supp. 1988) (a
number of cases have abandoned or relaxed the doctrine of caveat emptor).
3. Elderkin v. Gaster, 447 Pa. 118, 123 n.10, 288 A.2d 771, 774 n.10 (1972).
4. See Grand, supra note 2, at 46. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 47-116 to
-121 (West 1989); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 10-201 to -205 (1988); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 46:3B-1 (West Supp. 1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-70.1 (Supp. 1989); W. VA. CODE §§
36B-4-114 to -117 (Supp. 1988) (protecting condominium purchasers).
5. See Grand, supra note 2, at 46. Although Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd., 2
K.B. 113 (1931), was the first common-law decision to recognize the implied warranty of
habitability, the rule was first recognized in South Carolina by Rutledge v. Dodenhoff,
254 S.C. 407, 175 S.E.2d 792 (1970).
6. See Worthey v. Holmes, 249 Ga. 104, 287 S.E.2d 9 (1982); Grand, supra note 2,
at 46; see also Note, Implied Warranties in New Home Sales-Is the Seller Defenseless?,
35 S.C.L. REv. 469, 469 n.2 (1984) (stating that Georgia and Virginia have rejected im-
plied warranty protection). Although the Note cited above states that Virginia rejects an
implied warranty, Virginia now recognizes this cause of action. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-
70.1 (Supp. 1988).
7. For cases imposing a reasonable inspection upon the home purchaser, see An-
notation, supra note 2, at 392-94.
8. See Annotation, Liability of Builder of Residence for Latent Defects Therein
As Running to Subsequent Purchasers From Original Vendee, 10 A.L.R.4TH 385, 394-400
(1981 & Supp. 1988).
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Neely9 South Carolina placed itself in the vanguard of states by
extending an implied warranty to remote home purchasers. The
court reasoned that privity is no longer required in South Caro-
lina and thus "an implied warranty for latent defects extends to
subsequent home purchasers for a reasonable amount of time."' 0
Similarly, the Wyoming Supreme Court noted that "any reason-
ing which would arbitrarily interpose a first buyer as an obstruc-
tion to someone equally as deserving of recovery is incomprehen-
sible."' 1  Other states extending the implied warranty to
subsequent purchasers include: Arizona, 12 Illinois, 3 Indiana, 4
New Jersey,15 Oklahoma,"' Texas,'7 and Virginia.' In limited
situations, Washington and Colorado also allow an implied war-
9. 275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d 768 (1980) (settling of the foundation caused extensive
damage).
10. Id. at 399, 271 S.E.2d at 770. For a thorough discussion of Terlinde, see Con-
tracts, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 33 S.C.L. REv. 33 (1981).
11. Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733, 736 (Wyo. 1979) (subsequent
purchaser allowed to sue the builder-vendor for latent defects in the electrical system
that created an unsafe condition). The court noted that recovery was "limited to latent
defects which become manifest after the purchase." Id.
12. See Nastri v. Wood Bros. Homes, Inc., 142 Ariz. 439, 442-43, 690 P.2d 158, 160-
61 (Ct. App. 1984) (attempted disclaimer of implied warranty of habitability in contract
with first purchaser was void against the subsequent purchaser as a matter of public
policy).
13. See Briarcliffe W. Townhouse Owners Ass'n v. Wiseman Constr. Co., 118 Ill.
App. 3d 163, 167, 454 N.E.2d 363, 365 (1983) (latent defects must be discovered within
reasonable period of time). See generally Niro, Let the Seller Beware! Illinois Adopts
the Implied Warranty of Fitness in the Sale of a New Home, 68 ILL. B.J. 770 (1980)
(history concerning Illinois' adoption of the implied warranty).
14. See Wagner Constr. Co. v. Noonan, 403 N.E.2d 1144, 1149-50 (Ind. Ct. App.
1980) (while recognizing that the implied warranty extends to subsequent purchasers,
court disallowed recovery because of subsequent purchasers' failure to notify the builder,
thus denying builder the opportunity to remedy the defect). For a discussion of the
scope of the implied warranty in Indiana, see Note, Indiana's Implied Warranty of Fit-
ness for Habitation: Limited Protection for Used Home Buyers, 57 IND. L.J. 479 (1981-
82).
15. See Hermes v. Staiano, 181 N.J. Super. 424, 432, 437 A.2d 925, 929 (Ct. Law
Div. 1981) (finding no logical reason to differentiate between initial and subsequent'
purchasers).
16. See Bridges v. Ferrell, 685 P.2d 409, 410 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984) (express war-
ranty did not preclude an implied warranty action by the subsequent purchaser).
17. See Gupta v. Ritter Homes, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 168, 169 (Tex. 1983) (implied
warranty, which protects against latent defects not discoverable upon a reasonable in-
spection, is automatically assigned to subsequent purchaser).
18. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-70.1 (Supp. 1988) (implied warranty survives the trans-
fer of title).
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ranty to extend to subsequent purchasers.19
A majority of courts have held that an implied warranty
does not extend to subsequent purchasers. 0 These courts reason
that a warranty is fundamentally a contract and, therefore, priv-
ity is required. Because subsequent purchasers are not in privity
with builder-vendors, these courts do not recognize a cause of
action based upon an implied warranty.2 Colorado,22 Connecti-
cut,2 3 Florida,2 4 Illinois,25 Mississippi,28  Missouri,27 and New
York28 have held that lack of privity bars subsequent purchasers
from an implied warranty claim. Because of an intermediate
owner, these states, therefore, deny subsequent home purchasers
the remedy afforded new home purchasers.
Although South Carolina allows subsequent purchasers a
cause of action for breach of an implied warranty for latent de-
fects, 29 the supreme court in Arvai v. Shaw3" qualified this rem-
edy. In Arvai the court held that an implied warranty attaches
only to the sale of new, as opposed to used, homes. 3' Apparently,
19. Although as a general rule in Colorado a subsequent purchaser has no implied
warranty of habitability, in special circumstances the warranty will be extended. See
Duncan v. Schuster-Graham Homes, Inc., 194 Colo. 441, 443-44, 578 P.2d 637, 638-39
(1978) (builder repurchased house from original purchaser, then sold it to subsequent
purchaser). The Washington Court of Appeals allowed the first occupant to recover on
an implied warranty theory despite two prior purchasers. See Gay v. Cornwall, 6 Wash.
App. 595, 598, 494 P.2d 1371, 1374 (1972); see also Annotation, supra note 8, at 394.
20. See Note, supra note 6, at 499.
21. See Navajo Circle, Inc. v. Development Concepts Corp., 373 So. 2d 689, 692 n.3
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (court allowed tort action against builder despite lack of priv-
ity, but disallowed action for breach of warranty).
22. See H.B. Bolas Enters., v. Zarlengo, 156 Colo. 530, 535, 400 P.2d 447, 450
(1965) (house was previously occupied).
23. See Coburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc., 173 Conn. 567, 570, 378 A.2d 599, 600 (1977)
(implied warranty does not extend to subsequent purchasers).
24. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
25. See Mellander v. Kileen, 86 Ill. App. 3d 213, 215, 407 N.E.2d 1137, 1139 (1980)
(lack of privity bars recovery).
26. See Hicks v. Greenville Lumber Co., 387 So. 2d 94, 96 (Miss. 1980) (implied
warranty exists only if house is new and plaintiff is first purchaser).
27. See John H. Armbruster & Co. v. Hayden Co.-Builder Dev., Inc., 622 S.W.2d
704, 705 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
28. See Butler v. Caldwell & Cook, Inc., 122 A.D.2d 559, 505 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Ct.
App. Div. 1986).
29. See Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 399, 271 S.E.2d 768, 770 (1980).
30. 289 S.C. 161, 345 S.E.2d 715 (1986). The court, however, focused on who places
a house into the stream of commerce. See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
31. See id. at 164, 345 S.E.2d at 717. Shaw, the custom builder, built the house for
the Farrs on their property. After completion the Farrs moved into the home but, when
5
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therefore, a builder can avoid liability by building for an inter-
mediate purchaser so that when the home is sold to the public it
is no longer considered "new," but instead has become "used."
Connecticut and Maryland, to solve this potential problem, have
enacted provisions that prevent vendors from utilizing interme-
diate purchasers in an attempt to evade statutory liability.32
Courts have imposed restrictions upon the amount of time
subsequent purchasers may discover latent defects. For example,
in Terlinde the South Carolina Supreme Court held that "an
implied warranty for latent defects extends to subsequent home
purchasers for a reasonable amount of time."3 The court did
not, however, define what constitutes a reasonable amount of
time. Does the traditional contract statute of limitations apply
or is the court suggesting that some shorter time period is appli-
cable? 34 Several states have addressed this question. For in-
stance, in Maryland and Virginia an implied warranty extends
for one year from the time title is delivered or from the time the
original purchaser takes possession, whichever occurs first.3 5 In
contrast, New Jersey's New Home Warranty and Builders' Re-
gistration Act provides a comprehensive warranty program in-
cluding a ten-year warranty for major construction defects. 6
Therefore, although caveat emptor has been abandoned in
the sale of new homes, a large number of states still deny subse-
quent purchasers an implied warranty cause of action. Assuming
they became dissatisfied, reconveyed it to Shaw. Shaw then sold the home to the
Semones. The Semones conveyed the home to the Arvais, the subsequent puchasers.
32. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-119 (West 1986); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 10-205 (1988). Neither statute allows subsequent purchasers an implied warranty
cause of action.
33. Terlinde, 275 S.C. at 399, 271 S.E.2d at 770 (emphasis added). See also Briar-
cliffe W. Townhouse Owners Ass'n v. Wiseman Constr. Co., 118 Ill. App. 3d 163, 167, 454
N.E.2d 363, 365 (1983) ("[A]n implied warranty of habitability may extend to a subse-
quent purchaser who discovers a latent defect within a reasonable time after the
purchase of a home .... ." (emphasis added)).
34. South Carolina recently enacted a statute of limitations for actions based upon
defective or unsafe improvements to real property. The action must be brought within 13
years after substantial completion of the improvement, absent a contractual agreement
to extend the period. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-640 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
35. See MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 10-204(b)(1) (1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-
70.1(E) (1986).
36. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3B-3(b)(3) (West Supp. 1989). For a thorough discus-
sion of the New Home Warranty and Builders' Registration Act, see Grand, supra note
2, at 53-55. "'Major construction defect' means any actual damage to the load bearing
portion of the home .... ." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3B-2(g) (West Supp. 1988).
1022 [Vol. 40
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purchasers have a cause of action, the additional time hurdle
must be cleared. In instances when purchasers are afforded only
one year, or a comparably short period of time, to discover de-
fects, home purchasers receive scant protection. Serious struc-
tural defects often take many years to manifest themselves.
Ironically, for the first few years vendors may be liable for leaky
faucets,37 yet later escape liability when a defective foundation
causes a home to sink. The one-year limit in Virginia and Mary-
land clearly illustrates the lobbying strength of the local Resi-
dential Home Builders Associations as compared to the unor-
ganized political power of the home-buying public.
In the majority of states, therefore, Mr. and Mrs.
Homebuyer would be unable to recover from Mr. Homebuilder
based upon an implied warranty because of the privity limita-
tion placed upon subsequent purchasers. The Homebuyers may
have an implied warranty cause of action against Vendors Incor-
porated, but as will be discussed later, this avenue of redress
also is limited.
B. Builder-Vendors: Tort Theory
Several states have held that builder-vendors may be liable
for negligent construction, 8 and of these, a few permit subse-
quent purchasers to recover for latent defects negligently caused
by builders. 9 The rationale for allowing negligence actions was
well summarized by the Supreme Court of Colorado in Cosmo-
politan Homes v. Weller.40 Rejecting the economic loss rule as a
bar to recovering damages caused by latent defects, the court
37. For a discussion that minor defects do not constitute a breach of an implied
warranty, see Note, supra note 6, at 494-96.
38. For a list of states recognizing a negligence cause of action, see Annotation,
supra note 2, at 397-99 (including Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Ohio
and Wyoming). But see Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 510 So.
2d 899, 901-02 (Fla. 1987) (Florida recently recognized that economic loss rule barred
tort claim of a nuclear steam generator purchaser).
39. See Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc. v. Weller, 663 P.2d 1041, 1045 (Colo. 1983) (sub-
sequent purchaser allowed to bring a claim for latent defects caused by builder's negli-
gence); McMillan v. Brune-Harpenau-Torbeck Builders, Inc., 8 Ohio St. 3d 3, 4-5, 455
N.E.2d 1276, 1277 (1983) (action against builder-vendor); Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co.,
264 Ind. 227, 229, 342 N.E.2d 619, 620-21 (1976) (subsequent purchaser may seek dam-
ages for economic loss caused by latent defects not reasonably discoverable by the subse-
quent purchaser).
40. 663 P.2d 1041 (Colo. 1987).
10231989]
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reasoned:
[T]here is no rationale reason to distinguish between negli-
gence resulting in personal injury and negligence resulting in
property damage. Attempts to distinguish a cause of action for
property damages as one sounding exclusively in contract be-
cause the damages represent an "economic loss" are unpersua-
sive. Logically, both injury to one's person and injury to one's
property result in economic loss.4
Some courts, however, provide that purchasers may recover for
economic loss only when negligent construction creates a danger-
ous or unsafe condition.42
Increasingly, states have held that home purchasers may not
recover purely economic losses in negligence actions.43 Moreover,
the United States Supreme Court recently upheld the economic
loss rule as barring a negligence claim in which the plaintiff
sought to recover purely economic losses.44 "Economic loss" re-
fers to the cost of repairing a defective product, the loss of use,
and lost profits. 45 Therefore, while a builder may be liable if a
negligently constructed house causes personal injury or damage
to tangible property located within that house, absent such dam-
ages the economic loss rule bars recovery of damages to the
house itself. Rather, the courts upholding the economic loss rule
41. Id. at 1044, n. 5 (citation omitted). See Barnes, 264 Ind. at 230, 342 N.E.2d at
621 ("The contention that a distinction should be drawn between mere 'economic loss'
and personal injury is without merit.").
42. See Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condominium, Inc. v. Whiting-Turner Con-
tracting Co., 308 Md. 18, 38, 517 A.2d 336, 344 (1986) (holding limited to cases when
negligent construction creates a risk of personal injury); see also Oates v. JAG, Inc., 314
N.C. 276, 277-78, 333 S.E.2d 222, 224 (1985) (pleadings indicated that the defect created
a dangerous condition).
43. See, e.g., Nastri v. Wood Bros. Homes, Inc., 142 Ariz. 439, 690 P.2d 158 (Ct.
App. 1984); Wheeling Trust & Say. Bank v. Tremco, Inc., 153 Ill. App. 3d 136, 142-43,
505 N.E.2d 1045, 1050 (1987) (to recover economic loss, plaintiff must allege defendant
breached a duty of care exhibited by his profession); Dutton v. International Harvester
Co., 504 N.E.2d 313, 318 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (in absence of personal injury, economic
loss could not be recovered for a defective planter); Ellis v. Robert C. Morris, Inc., 128
N.H. 358, 367, 513 A.2d 951, 954-55 (1986) (no tort duty exists with respect to economic
loss); Butler v. Caldwell & Cook, 122 A.D.2d 559, 505 N.Y.S.2d 280, 290 (Ct. App. Div.
1986) (economic loss rule barred recovery of defective siding and sheathing).
44. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 876
(1986) (admiralty claim).
45. See Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho
348, 351, 544 P.2d 306, 309 (1975).
1024 [Vol. 40
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have held that in cases of pure economic loss, the purchaser's
remedy resides in contract.4" Thus, purchasers must rely on ex-
press and implied warranty actions. The rationale for the eco-
nomic loss rule rests on judicial reluctance to allow unlimited
liability.
47
The Fourth Circuit, interpreting South Carolina law, disal-
lowed a negligence claim in which the plaintiff sought to recover
the repair costs of a defective roof. Instead, the court held that
plaintiff's remedy rested solely in contract.48 In Terlinde, how-
ever, the South Carolina Supreme Court allowed a subsequent
purchaser to sue the builder in tort because of the existence of a
latent defect,49 but did not discuss the economic loss rule. Re-
cently, the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that Terlinde
did not address or abolish the economic loss rule.5 0 Rather, the
court of appeals stated Terlinde was limited to its facts and up-
held the economic loss rule as barring an owners' negligence
cause of action. 1
If the Homebuyers live in one of the increasing number of
states adhering to the economic loss rule, a negligence action
against Mr. Homebuilder will fail because they have suffered
purely economic losses; only their home has been damaged. If
the defect had personally injured the Homebuyers or damaged
any of their household property, these states may afford them a
remedy. In jurisdictions recognizing the economic loss rule, the
Homebuyers would have to resort to a contract cause of action.
The Indiana Supreme Court recognized the problem with this
46. See, e.g., Woodward v. Chirco Constr. Co., 141 Ariz. 514, 516, 687 P.2d 1269,
1271 (1984) ("For example, if a fireplace collapses, the purchaser can sue in contract for
the cost of remedying the structural defects and sue in tort for damage to personal prop-
erty or personal injury caused by the collapse.").
47. For a discussion of the problem of allowing purely economic loss in a negligence
action, see Perlman, Interference with Contract and Other Economic Expectancies: A
Clash of Tort and Contract Doctrine, 49 U. CH. L. REV. 60 (1982).
48. See 2000 Watermark Assocs., Inc. v. Celotex Corp., 784 F.2d 1183, 1187-88 (4th
Cir. 1986). The court noted that Terlinde was not applicable because the case was con-
cerned with latent defects.
49. See Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 399, 271 S.E.2d 768, 770 (1980).
50. See Carolina Winds Owners' Ass'n v. Joe Harden Builder, Inc., 297 S.C. 74, 83,
374 S.E.2d 897, 903 (Ct. App. 1988) ("Unlike the defendants in this case, the builder in
Terlinde built the house for speculation, not pursuant to a contract for its construc-
tion."), afl'd on rehearing, No. 25 Davis Adv. Sh. 21 (S.C. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 1988).
51. See id. at -, 374 S.E.2d at 906 (the right to a well-constructed building arises
from owner's contract, and thus, the owner's remedy "lies in contract, not negligence").
1989] 1025
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approach. The court asked: "Does the law penalize those who
are alert and prevent injury? Should it not put those who pre-
vent personal injury on the same level as those who fail to antic-
ipate it?"'52
C. Builder-Vendors: Other Causes of Action
In addition to implied warranty and negligence claims, sub-
sequent purchasers may claim the benefit of an express war-
ranty. If a builder-vendor makes an express warranty to the first
purchasers, they undisputably have a valid claim. In Oklahoma
an express warranty does not preclude an implied warranty ac-
tion unless the contract provides for this preclusion in clear and
conspicuous language.5 3 A subsequent purchaser's lack of privity
with the warrantor, however, prevents an action based upon a
builder-vendor's express warranty. 4 On the other hand, if a sub-
sequent purchaser was a contemplated beneficiary of the con-
tract, a third-party beneficiary claim may be successful. 5 Such
claims rarely have been successful.5
Subsequent purchasers may be protected if their builders
participated in the Home Owner's Warranty (HOW) program.
The builder purchases this warranty, and it is automatically
transferred to subsequent purchasers. The warranty extends for
a ten-year period during which certain parts of the house are
protected for different lengths of time. For instance, minor
problems are covered for the first two years, while the structural
integrity of the house is covered by a full ten-year warranty. The
builder is responsible for defects occurring within the first two
52. Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co., 264 Ind. 227, 229, 342 N.E.2d 619, 621 (1976)
(reasoning that a home buyer should not have to wait until an actual injury occurs to
recover his damages).
53. See Bridges v. Ferrell, 685 P.2d 409, 410-11 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984).
54. See Governors Grove Condominium Ass'n v. Hill Dev. Corp., 36 Conn. Supp.
144, 147, 414 A.2d 1177, 1180 (Super. Ct. 1980) (one not a party to a contract cannot sue
to enforce the contract); Butler v. Caldwell & Cook, 122 A.D.2d 559, -, 505 N.Y.S.2d
280, 290 (Ct. App. Div. 1986) (plaintiff failed to plead that the warranty was intended to
benefit third parties).
55. See Governors Grove Condominium Ass'n, 36 Conn. Supp. at 147, 414 A.2d at
1180 (recognizing that a party to a contract or a contemplated beneficiary may enforce
the contract).
56. See Wheeling Trust & Sav. Bank v. Tremco, Inc., 153 Ill. App. 3d 136, 140, 505
N.E.2d 1045, 1048 (1987) (intent to benefit a third party must be established by an ex-
press provision in contract).
1026 [Vol. 40
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years; however, the insurer assumes liability should the builder
fail to fulfill his obligations. Thus, home purchasers are pro-
tected should their builder become insolvent. 7
Not surprisingly, Mr. T.V. Lawyer discovered that Mr.
Homebuilder had not participated in the HOW program. Only
twenty-five percent of America's homebuilders participate in
this program.5 8 He further discovered that neither Mr.
Homebuilder nor Vendors Incorporated had made any express
warranties. In fact, the real estate contract contained an "as is"
disclaimer of all express and implied warranties.5 Even if the
original real estate contract had contained an express warranty,
the Homebuyers likely would be unable to enforce the contract
because of the improbability of qualifying as third-party
beneficiaries.
D. Builder-Nonvendors: Implied Warranty
Few courts have addressed the question of whether a party
who builds houses for developers or private parties pursuant to a
construction contract (builder-nonvendor) may be sued for
breaching an implied warranty. Builder-nonvendors do not build
houses and sell them to the general public. The majority of
states upholding an implied warranty have done so in the con-
text of builder-vendors or vendors.60 Therefore, it is unclear
whether courts upholding an implied warranty will make a dis-
tinction when considering builder-nonvendors.
At least one state, Maryland, has defined "vendor" to in-
clude builders, and thus, it is immaterial whether the builder
actually sells the home. The Maryland statute, which establishes
an implied warranty, defines "vendor" as "any person engaged
in the business of erecting or otherwise creating an improvement
on realty, or to whom a completed improvement has been
57. See Note, supra note 6, at 491-92.
58. See The Home Buyer's Guide to HOW, 1985 (pamphlet available from local
Homeowner's Warranty Corporation).
59. For a discussion of the "as is" disclaimer in the sale of new homes, see Larson,
The "As Is" Disclaimer and the Sale of New Houses, 13 REAt EsT. L.J. 238 (1984).
60. See Annotation, supra note 2, at 413 ("[T]he courts have taken the view that a
builder-vendor or other vendor of a new dwelling may be held liable for loss, injury, or
damage occasioned by a defective condition of the dwelling, on the theory of breach of
an implied warranty of habitability or quality." (emphasis added)).
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granted for resale in the course of his business."6" In dicta, the
Supreme Court of Illinois indicated that "repair costs should be
borne by the responsible builder-vendor who created the latent
defect. '6 2 If Illinois follows the rationale of this dicta, builder-
nonvendors may be liable for construction defects since as build-
ers they are responsible for creating those defects.
6 3
In contrast, South Carolina does not recognize the existence
of an implied warranty cause of action against builder-
nonvendors. The South Carolina Supreme Court reasoned that
"when a new building is sold there is an implied warranty of
fitness for its intended use which springs from the sale itself."'64
While recognizing that the seller-nonbuilder's liablility was not
founded upon fault, the court held that "because [the seller] has
profited by receiving a fair price and, as between [the seller] and
an innocent purchaser, the innocent purchaser should be pro-
tected from latent defects." 65 The court implied that a builder-
nonvendor would not be liable under an implied warranty the-
ory. Several years later in Arvai v. Shaw"e the court clarified its
position. The court reasoned that "[h]olding the custom builder
liable under an implied warranty, where he is not also involved
in the sale of the house, would be incompatible with the law of.
warranty.
1 7
The court's holding leaves an anomalous result in South
Carolina. As previously discussed, homebuilders may be able to
avoid an implied warranty by building houses for intermediate
purchasers, such as shell companies, so that the homes are not
considered "new" when they are sold to the general public.68 In
addition to this tactic, builders may be able to avoid implied
warranty liability to subsequent purchasers by building under
61. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 10-201(e) (Michie 1988) (emphasis added).
62. Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 Ill. 2d 171, 183, 441 N.E.2d 324, 330 (1982) (em-
phasis added).
63. For a discussion of South Carolina's misplaced reliance upon Redarowicz, see
Property, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 39 S.C.L. REV. 131, 136-37 (1987).
64. Lane v. Trenholm Bldg. Co., 267 S.C. 497, 500, 229 S.E.2d 728, 729 (1976). The
court held a nonbuilder-vendor, who did not build the house, liable. The nonbuilder-
vendor, however, had undertaken the cloak of a builder by installing a new septic system,
and thus, a court may use this factor to distinguish Lane.
65. Id. at 503, 229 S.E.2d at 731.
66. 289 S.C. 161, 345 S.E.2d 715 (1986).
67. Id. at 164, 345 S.E.2d at 717.
68. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
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contract exclusively for developers or private individuals rather
than building "speculative homes," those to be sold to the gen-
eral public.
What is to prevent builders from establishing their own
shell vendor corporations? Such a possibility would create night-
mares for home buyers who would face the difficult task of pierc-
ing the corporate veil. In South Carolina, builders must establish
proof of financial responsibility or execute a $10,000 bond with
an approved surety before they can become licensed residential
home builders.69 Developers and other vendors, however, are not
required to be bonded or to establish financial responsibility.
What benefit is a bond or a fiscally sound builder when home
purchasers may have virtually no recourse against these
builders?
Although the South Carolina statute establishing the bond
does not expressly confer upon home buyers a private cause of
action, in Watson v. Harmon70 the court of appeals recognized a
private cause of action, reasoning that the legislative intent was
"'to protect the home buying public from . . . financially irre-
sponsible builders.' ,,71 In Watson, however, the builder and
plaintiff had entered into an oral contract to construct an addi-
tional room. 7 2 Whether the court will extend such a private
cause of action to subsequent home purchasers is unclear. Also
remaining to be answered is whether private parties will be
granted a cause of action against the bond when builders are
nonvendors. Given the court's broad conclusion that the bond
was intended to benefit the public, perhaps courts will be willing
to extend the private cause of action. 3 On the other hand, the
court's reluctance in Arvai v. Shaw to hold builder-nonvendors
liable may lead courts to conclude that since builder-nonvendors
are not liable, then no action should exist against the bonds that
they post.74
69. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-59-70(b) (Law. Co-op. 1986). For a definition of resi-
dential home builder, see id. § 40-59-10.
70. 280 S.C. 214, 312 S.E.2d 8 (Ct. App. 1984).
71. Id. at 218, 312 S.E.2d at 11 (citing Henderson v. Evans, 268 S.C. 127, 136, 232
S.E.2d 331, 336 (1977) (Gregory, J., dissenting)).
72. See id. at 216, 312 S.E.2d at 9.
73. For an excellent discussion of Watson, see Property, Annual Survey of South
Carolina Law, 37 S.C.L. REv. 211 (1985).
74. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
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Further, in Kennedy v. Henderson 5 when faced with the
identical public policy argument, the court recognized that the
bond's protection extends only to "those violations falling within
the coverage of the particular surety bond provisions."" The
court continued by noting that the bond was intended to assure
the "builder's compliance with certain rules and regulations per-
taining to construction standards and health and safety require-
ments."" In Kennedy the plaintiff was attempting to recover
$11,000, which was advanced to the builder to construct a
"dwelling-house type building to be used as a nursery."7 8 The
builder refused to begin construction and the court denied re-
covery, stating that the bond is not a "performance bond guar-
anteeing the completion of the work contracted." 9 The bond's
protection is clearly limited in its protective scope.
In any event, $10,000 affords home purchasers very little
protection, especially in instances involving major structural
damage. Also, if more than one claim is filed against the bond,
the money must be divided among the parties filing such claims.
Thus, even several relatively minor mistakes by the builder
could result in the depletion of the bond. Once the bond is de-
pleted, later claimants will receive nothing."
Whether the Mr. and Mrs. Homebuyer will have an implied
warranty claim against Mr. Homebuilder is unclear. In at least
one state, Maryland, such a claim could be successful. In South
Carolina, however, the Homebuyers would be compelled to seek
another remedy. Assuming the courts will not allow an implied
warranty claim, they will be equally unlikely to allow an action
against the bond. Instead, the Homebuyers would have to re-
cover from the seller, Vendors Incorporated. Unless more states
address these questions, other homebuyers will be exposed to ex-
pensive litigation to resolve many of these issues.
75. 289 S.C. 393, 346 S.E.2d 526 (1986).
76. Id. at 396, 346 S.E.2d at 528.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 394, 346 S.E.2d at 527.
79. Id. at 396, 346 S.E.2d at 528.
80. The information was obtained from an interview with the Director of the South
Carolina Residential Home Builders Commission. At present the Commission has not
published formal regulations concerning a claims procedure. This lack of procedure is
not surprising considering a private cause of action against the bond was just recently
recognized.
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E. Builder-Nonvendors: Tort Theory
In negligence claims, the courts apparently have made no
distinction between builder-vendors and builder-nonvendors. 8'
Since courts that have allowed subsequent purchasers to recover
for builder's negligence have held that foreseeability and not
privity is determinative, these courts likely will not deny recov-
ery simply because a builder did not sell the house.s2 After all, if
the courts are going to allow negligence claims against builder-
vendors, harm does not become less foreseeable merely because
the builder does not sell also the house. Whether this distinction
will affect a home buyer's negligence claim remains to be seen.
In any event, the obstacle of the economic loss rule still persists
for homebuyers attempting to bring negligence claims .
3
F. Nonbuilder- Vendors: Implied Warranty
The fact that a vendor did not build a house should not
prevent the vendor from being liable based upon an implied
warranty. 4 "The vendor agrees to provide a product, and if the
product is defective, he should be liable. Of course the ultimate
liability may rest with the actual builder, who may be joined as a
third-party defendant.
8 s5
At least two states have indicated that nonbuilder-vendors
may be liable on an implied warranty theory. In Smith v. Old
Warson Development Co.s6 the Missouri court recognized that a
vendors' liability is not founded upon negligence, knowledge, or
fault. Similarly, in Lane v. Trenholm Building Co.8 7 the Su-
preme Court of South Carolina held that "when a new building
is sold there is an implied warranty of fitness for its intended
81. See Anrotation, supra note 8, at 389-93 (cases discussed fail to draw a distinc-
tion between builder-vendors and builder-nonvendors).
82. See Coburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc., 173 Conn. 567, 575, 378 A.2d 599, 603 (1977)
(court reasoned that there was no reason why a builder-vendor should not be liable for
his negligence if the effects were foreseeable by a reasonable man).
83. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
84. See McNamara, The Implied Warranty in New-House Construction Revisited,
3 REAL EsT. L.J. 136, 141-42 (1974).
85. Id. at 142.
86. 479 S.W.2d 795, 798 (Mo. 1972).
87. 267 S.C. 497, 229 S.E.2d 728 (1976).
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use which springs from the sale itself."88 Although the court rec-
ognized that the nonbuilder-vendor's liability is not founded
upon fault, the court held that as between a vendor and an inno-
cent purchaser, the vendor will be held liable. 9 Although every
state except Georgia recognizes an implied warranty cause of ac-
tion against vendors of new homes, 0 are purchasers really pro-
tected? Assuming these courts will treat nonbuilder-vendors the
same as builder-vendors, just how much protection is afforded
home purchasers? As previously discussed, many states do not
recognize the existence of an implied warranty when subsequent
home purchasers sue builder-vendors; therefore, these states
probably will not allow an implied warranty theory when subse-
quent purchasers sue nonbuilder-vendors.9'
Furthermore, many vendors do not exist several years after
a subdivision is complete. "Indeed, the [vendor] may well have
been a collapsible corporation which, like Maeterlinck's, ceased
to exist when the last house was sold. '9 2 Thus, states that deem
the vendor as the primary source for recovery may have pro-
vided home purchasers, whether original or subsequent, with a
procedural right devoid of any substantive merit.
Mr. and Mrs. Homebuyer discovered that Mr. Homebuilder
formed Vendors, Incorporated for the sole purpose of selling
houses that he constructed in the Sinking Sands subdivision.
While Connecticut and Maryland93 probably would protect orig-
inal purchasers from the builder's tactics, in South Carolina it is
unclear whether the Homebuyers would be able to recover di-
rectly against Mr. Homebuilder, the builder-nonvendor. Also, as
88. Id. at 500, 229 S.E.2d at 729.
89. See id. at 503, 229 S.E.2d at 731. Under Lane, however, the nonbuilder-vendor
assumed the cloak of a builder by undertaking to install a new septic system. Lane,
therefore, may be limited to its facts. See supra note 64.
90. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
91. See Vetor v. Shockey, 414 N.E.2d 575 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980):
Our research, however, has uncovered no Indiana cases expanding this implied
warranty concept to the purchaser of a used house from a non builder-vendor.
Those jurisdictions which have been confronted with such factual situations
have universally rejected such expansion. The refusal to extend the doctrine is
seemingly premised on the idea that in the sale of used housing, the vendor
usually has no greater expertise in determining the quality of a house than the
purchaser.
Id. at 577 (emphasis in original).
92. Roberts, supra note 1, at 836.
93. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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subsequent purchasers, many states would deny the
Homebuyers an implied warranty cause of action. The implied
warranty theory does not provide the Homebuyers with as much
protection as it might appear initially.
G. Prior Owners, Real Estate Agents: Fraud
Subsequent home purchasers will find it extremely difficult
to establish fraud against prior owners and against their real es-
tate agents, especially if their damages are caused by latent de-
fects. Because fraud requires mental culpability, no fraud can be
committed unless the prior owners or real estate agent knew of a
defect when the house was sold. Latent defects by their very na-
ture do not manifest themselves until after some period of time
has elapsed. Consequently, in the majority of cases prior home
owners and real estate agents lack the requisite knowledge to
commit fraud. In any event, the difficulty of proving the ele-
ments of fraud creates a very difficult road for plaintiffs seeking
this avenue of redress.
For example, South Carolina plaintiffs must prove by clear,
cogent, and convincing evidence the following nine elements:94
1) a representation; 2) its falsity; 3) its materiality; 4) knowl-
edge of its falsity or a reckless disregard of its truth or falsity;
5) intent that the representation be acted upon; 6) the hearer's
ignorance of its falsity; 7) the hearer's reliance on its truth; 8)
the hearer's right to rely thereon; and 9) the hearer's conse-
quent and proximate injury.95
If one element is not proven then the fraud cause of action
fails.9 6
In May v. Hopkinson97 the court recognized that the buyer
has a right "to rely on a seller of a home to disclose latent de-
fects or hidden conditions which are not discoverable on a rea-
sonable examination of the property and of which the seller has
94. See Schie v. Gay & Taylor, Inc., 290 S.C. 31, 34, 347 S.E.2d 910, 911 (Ct. App.
1986).
95. Florentine Corp. v. Peda I, Inc., 287 S.C. 382, 385-86, 339 S.E.2d 112, 113-14
(1985).
96. See id.
97. 289 S.C. 549, 347 S.E.2d 508 (Ct. App. 1986).
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knowledge."98 Therefore, if the seller has knowledge of the de-
fect, the plaintiff may be able to prove fraud. In May the vendor
and real estate agent were found liable for fraud. The prior
owner had hired someone to conceal rotten areas of the exterior
of the house.9 9 Additionally, the real estate agent obtained two
repair estimates for a window. One estimate contained a warning
that the estimate did not include the cost of repairing structural
damage, while the other estimate did not contain this warning.
The purchaser received only the estimate that made no refer-
ence to the structural damage.100 Knowledge by the owner and
real estate agent was, therefore, established.
In rare instances subsequent purchasers may be able to es-
tablish fraud against a builder. In Herz v. Thornwood Acres
"D," Inc.0 1 the court held that the builder intended for the sub-
sequent purchaser to rely on his false representations. The court
emphasized that the builder filed a "guarantee" for the separate
sewage system with the county health department and admitted
that he represented to the purchasers and their successors that
the septic system was properly constructed. 02 Without this fil-
ing and representation, the subsequent purchasers probably
would not have prevailed. As a general rule, therefore, absent a
direct representation to the subsequent purchasers, a builder's
indirect representations concerning the quality of a house will
not give rise to a successful fraud cause of action.03
If Mr. and Mrs. Homebuyer could establish that the prior
owners or the real estate agent knew of the structural problems
and failed to reveal them, they may be able to recover for fraud.
The structural problems, however, did not manifest themselves
until well after the Homebuyers had purchased their home.
Therefore, at the time the house was sold, the Wesoldits and the
Homebuyers' real estate agent had no knowledge of the struc-
tural defects. Thus, the nature of latent defects prevents fraud
98. Id. at 557, 347 S.E.2d at 513.
99. See id. at 555, 347 S.E.2d at 512.
100. See id. at 556, 347 S.E.2d at 512.
101. 86 Misc. 2d 53, 381 N.Y.S.2d 761 (1976), afl'd per curiam, 91 Misc. 2d 130, 397
N.Y.S.2d 358 (1977) (a two-year express warranty had expired).
102. See id. at 56, 59, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 763, 765.
103. See Sponseller v. Meltebeke, 280 Or. 361, 364, 570 P.2d 974, 975 (1977)
(builder's representation that all inspections required by law had been performed insuffi-
cient to confer a fraud cause of action upon a subsequent purchaser).
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from being a reliable remedy, especially for subsequent purchas-
ers seeking to hold the builder liable.
H. Lender Liability
Although banks and other lending institutions would pro-
vide home purchasers with a deep pocket, the majority of states
have refused to hold lenders liable for construction defects.1 0 4
The financing agency "refers to any financing institution which
finances the purchaser, the vender, or both. '10 5 Home purchasers
have attempted to argue that when lenders make inspections
they have assumed a duty of care to the home buyers. The
courts, however, have recognized that lenders may make inspec-
tions or monitor the progress of construction for their own pro-
tection without exposing themselves to liability for construction
defects. 106 If, however, lenders engage in activities ancillary to
normal lending practices, liability may be imposed.10 7
In California lenders are not liable to third persons for a
borrower's failure to use due care in constructing real property
"unless such loss or damage is a result of an act of the lender
outside the scope of the activities of a lender of money or unless
the lender has been a party to misrepresentations with respect
to such real . . . property."'' 08 In Connor v. Great Savings &
Loan Association0 9 the court held that the lender owed the
buyers a duty of care to protect them from structural defects.
The lender, however, had assumed control of the development
and participated in the financing of plaintiffs' homes. Further,
the bank's success directly depended upon its own ability, as
104. See Annotation, Financing Agency's Liability To Purchaser of New Home or
Structure for Consequences of Construction Defects, 39 A.L.R.3D 247 (1971 & Supp.
1988).
105. Id. at 247 n.1.
106. See Butts v. Atlanta Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 152 Ga. App. 40, 42-43, 262
S.E.2d 230, 232-33 (1979) (lender had no legal duty to protect purchasers from defects);
Wierzbicki v. Alaska Mut. Say. Bank, 630 P.2d 998, 1001 (Alaska 1981) (bank not liable
for the vendor's nonperformance since loan agreement allowed bank to inspect the pro-
gress of construction to protect its own interests).
107. See Loyola Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Galanes, 33 Md. App. 559, 569, 365 A.2d
580, 586 (1976) (saving and loan was held liable for fraud).
108. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3434 (West 1970) (codifying the holding of Conner v. Great W.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968)).
109. 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968).
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well as the developer's ability, to induce persons to purchase the
houses. 110 Lenders may, therefore, run the risk of incurring lia-
bility if they engage in activities traditionally outside the scope
of normal lending practices.
South Carolina follows the majority view and refuses to im-
pose liability on lenders. In Roundtree Villas Association v.
4701 Kings Corp.' the court, while refusing to hold a lender
liable for negligent construction, recognized that if the lender
chose to repair any defects, it must exercise due care in making
those repairs. The court failed to indicate whether it would rec-
ognize an exception similar to the one in effect in California.
1 12
Considering the courts' reluctance to hold lenders liable to
original purchasers, it seems very unlikely that courts will pro-
tect subsequent purchasers. In Bradler v. Craig"' the California
Court of Appeals held that the lender was not liable to the sub-
sequent purchasers of a house. The court, however, did distin-
guish Connor, thus suggesting that a lender may be liable to
subsequent purchasers if the lender engages in activities apart
from its role as lender.114 The absence of cases holding vendors
liable indicates that lenders are not engaging in activities that
would expose them to liability. Accordingly, purchasers are un-
likely to be successful in recovering damages from vendors.
Vendors Incorporated obtained financing from Greedy Na-
tional Bank. Greedy was careful to provide contractually for its
right to monitor the construction of Sinking Sands before dis-
bursing any money. The contract clearly provides that such in-
spections are "solely for the benefit of Greedy National Bank
and not intended to benefit any purchasers or subsequent pur-
chasers of Sinking Sands homes." The Homebuyers probably
110. See id. at 865-66, 447 P.2d at 617, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 377. In making its determi-
nation the court considered:
[1] the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, [2]
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, [3] the degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered injury, [4] the closeness of the connection between the de-
fendant's conduct and the injury suffered, [5] the moral blame attached to the
defendant's conduct, and [6] the policy of preventing future harm.
Id. (quoting Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 650, 320 P.2d 16 (1958)).
111. 282 S.C. 415, 321 S.E.2d 46 (1984).
112. For a thorough discussion of Roundtree Villas, see Property, Annual Survey of
South Carolina Law, 37 S.C.L. REv. 208 (1985).
113. 274 Cal. App. 2d 466, 79 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1969).
114. See Bradler, 274 Cal. App. 2d at 475-76, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
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would be unsuccessful in an attempt to recover from Greedy Na-
tional Bank.
III. ADEQUACY OF EXISTING REMEDIES
Although this Note is not suggesting that in every state the
Homebuyers would be unable to recover their damages, the
Homebuyers, as subsequent purchasers, certainly will face a dif-
ficult road to recovery. Is the proposed hypothetical a realistic
concern or merely an unlikely scenario? The sheer volume of lit-
igation involving home defects demonstrates the true magnitude
of the problem. Furthermore, one cannot reasonably deny that
many persons purchase "used" homes that are only a few years
old. People who buy such houses probably consider these homes
to be "new." Assuming a remedy exists, the uncertainty sur-
rounding this area of the law will continue to expose home buy-
ers to expensive litigation. Furthermore, even if home buyers
can establish liability in this unsettled area of the law, what are
the chances that they will be able to locate a solvent party?
Knowledge of the problems associated with housing defects
is apparently disseminating to the home-buying public. Today
many home buyers, in an effort to protect themselves from
sloppy workmanship, hire private home inspectors to examine
homes before they buy.115 One South Carolina inspector esti-
mates that in his ten years of inspecting Columbia homes, "75
percent are in good condition; 15 percent are going to cost a sub-
stantial amount of money to fix; and 10 percent are such that
(he doesn't) want anyone to get involved with them."'16 Accord-
ing to his estimates, then, twenty-five percent of home purchas-
ers can expect to incur substantial expenses in repairing their
"new" home.
Although private inspectors may prevent some home pur-
chasers from making an expensive mistake, not all purchasers
are sophisticated enough to take such precautions. Further, in
South Carolina private inspectors are not required to be certified
115. See Ivey, Check Credentials of Home Inspectors, The State (Columbia, South
Carolina), Sept. 10, 1988, at El, col. 4.
116. Id. at E3, col. 2 (the inspector, Carlos Frick of Home Inspection Consultants of
Columbia Inc., inspected over 400 homes).
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or to have any building experience. 117 Consequently, many in-
spectors actually may provide purchasers little protection. Negli-
gent inspectors, however, may serve as another possible source
from which the purchaser may recover their damages. Further,
inspectors, like home purchasers, may not be able to discover
"latent" defects.
The problem with poor construction practices is not con-
fined to South Carolina. In fact, the problem is clearly national
in scope. For example, each year approximately forty builders
are removed from the National House-Building Council (NHBC)
lists for "persistent failure to meet the NHBC's construction
standards, because [NHBC construction standards] effectively
force[] the builder out of the new homes market."118 Members of
NHBC pay "one-quarter and one-half of 1 per cent of the sale
price of a property to get the NHBC's 10-year guarantee and the
builders have to bear the costs of any remedial works in the first
three of those years."' 19 If a builder is no longer available to set-
tle a claim, NHBC assumes liability, and in 1985 alone, approxi-
mately ten percent of the builders were unable to assume re-
sponsibility for their full three-year period. 20 If quality
construction standards make it difficult for builders to compete,
it naturally follows that many successfully competing builders
are not producing high quality work.
The Home Builders Association of Maryland, an industry
group, has opposed licensing of new home builders, the creation
of any state commission, or the creation of a guarantee fund.' 2 '
In Washington, home buyers are discovering that "the most ag-
gravating part of buying a new house isn't arranging financing,
but getting a builder to fix defects after they move in. "122
In addition to the foregoing obstacles, home purchasers face
many legal barriers. Courts distinguish between the following:
new and used homes; original and remote purchasers; and
117. See id. at El, col. 5.
118. Brennan, Property; Builders That Get Struck Off, The Financial Times Lim-
ited; Financial Times, Aug. 9, 1986, at 7.
119. Id.
120. See id. The article, however, does not clarify whether the discussed builders
have gone out of business or merely are no longer members of the NHBC.
121. See Maryland Assembly Approves Bills for Home Buyers, The Washington
Post, Apr. 25, 1987, at F6.
122. Hankin, Buyers Battle Builders, The Washington Post, Sept. 20, 1986, at El.
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builder-vendors, builder-nonvendors, and nonbuilder-vendors. A
home buyer's case may turn on one of the distinctions. In addi-
tion, the application of the economic loss rule may provide yet
another hurdle to overcome. Assuming a purchaser is fortunate
enough to overcome these barriers, he has no guarantee that the
defendant will be able to pay the home buyer's damages.
Suppose another recession similar to the one that occurred
in the early 1970s occurred at approximately the same time Mr.
and Mrs. Homebuyer purchased their home from Mr. & Mrs.
Glad Wesoldit. As in the 1970s, the high interest rates of the
recession priced many would-be homeowners out of the housing
market. As a result, many home builders, including Mr.
Homebuilder, were caught with houses they could not sell. Con-
sequently, the resulting loss of capital flow forced thousands of
home builders out of business. If Mr. Homebuilder becomes
bankrupt, the Homebuyers' primary source of recovery disap-
pears. If the builder is also the vendor, the purchaser is doubly
deprived. A recession-induced bankruptcy, therefore, could leave
the Homebuyers without a viable remedy.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
What steps are needed to avoid the problems encountered
by the Homebuyers? Enacting mandatory home warranty laws
would be one possible solution. Briefly, such programs should re-
quire residential builders to purchase insurance that would in-
sure purchasers - original, as well as subsequent - for a desig-
nated period of time. Minor problems would be insured for the
first two years while major structural problems, which take more
time to manifest themselves, would be covered for a full ten
years. Mandatory insurance would improve construction quality
and reward conscientious builders with lower rates, thus making
the cost of quality homes competitive with shoddy homes. Al-
though home buyers would eventually incur the cost of this pro-
gram, the benefits outweigh the comparably low cost. The ma-
jority of home purchasers, if asked, probably would be unwilling
to gamble their home when several hundred dollars of insurance
could provide ten years of protection, as well as adequate time
for possible latent defects to reveal themselves.
The Home Owners Warranty (HOW) program provides an
excellent model from which to construct a mandatory home war-
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ranty program. The HOW program divides coverage into three
time periods. During each period, specified portions of the house
are insured against defects. During the first two years, the
builder remains responsible for repairing any defects. If, how-
ever, the builder fails to fulfill this obligation, the insurer as-
sumes liability. Furthermore, home owners are responsible for
the first $250 of damages; thus, frivolous claims are discour-
aged. 123 During the first year, builders are liable for a variety of
potential minor defects. This liability is limited to those defects
not due to homeowners' failure to undertake routine mainte-
nance, such as cleaning gutters. For the second year, coverage
continues for defective plumbing systems, ventilation systems,
and electrical systems. If, however, the problems are due to
home owners' negligence, the home owner assumes all repair
costs. Major structural defects are covered by a ten-year
warranty.
A major structural defect is defined as physical damage to
the load-bearing portions of the house so that the house be-
comes unsafe or unlivable. Load-bearing portions include: foun-
dations, beams, girders, lintels, columns, walls and partitions,
floor systems, and roof frames. Purchasers, therefore, are pro-
tected from those major defects that may not be revealed for
several years. HOW's requirement that the defect must make
the house unsafe or unlivable, however, presents the same prob-
lem as discussed in regard to the economic loss rule. Arguably, a
house should not be required to become unsafe before damages
are recoverable. Broader protection needs to be afforded to pur-
chasers so that major defects can be corrected as soon as they
are discovered. 124
This proposed home warranty program is not an entirely
novel idea. In fact, New Jersey's New Home Warranty and
Builders' Registration Act (Act) is remarkably similar to the
HOW program. According to the Act, the house is warranted
during the first year against "defects caused by faulty workman-
ship and defective materials due to noncompliance with the
building standards.' 125 During the second year, the warranty
123. The information was obtained from a 1987 specimen of the Insurance/War-
ranty Documents of the Home Owners Warranty Corporation.
124. See id.
125. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3B-3(b)(1) (West Supp. 1989). For a discussion of the New
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provides that "the dwelling shall be free from defects caused by
faulty installation of plumbing, electrical, heating and cooling
delivery systems; however, in the case of appliances, no warranty
shall exceed the length and scope of the warranty offered by the
manufacturer.' 126 Major construction defects are covered for a
full ten years. 127 Similar to HOW's definition, major construc-
tion defect is defined as "actual damage to the load bearing por-
tion of the home.'
1 28
Rather than operating on an insurance basis, the Act pro-
vides that all home builders must participate in the "new home
warranty security fund or an approved alternate new home war-
ranty program. '129 The Commissioner of the Department of
Community Affairs is responsible for determining the amounts
to be paid into the fund. He is also responsible for disbursing
the funds when a builder fails to remedy reported defects. 3 °
Builders, however, are liable only for the original purchase price
of the home.'' Apparently, the Act also protects subsequent
purchasers of new homes.
3 2
The only significant difference between the Act and the pro-
posed home warranty program is that the Act is administered by
the commissioner while the proposed insurance program would
be administered largely by private insurance companies with
some state supervision. Also, the insurance program would limit
builders' liability to two years, rather than ten years; after two
years, the insurer assumes liability. The adoption of either pro-
gram would clearly benefit the home-buying public.
Using the present HOW program as a guide, the estimated
Home Warranty and Builders' Registration Act, see Grand, supra note 2, at 53-55.
126. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3B-3(b)(2) (West. Supp. 1989).
127. See id. § 46:3B-3(b)(3).
128. Id. § 46:3B-2(g).
129. Id. § 46:3B-5. The HOW program may qualify as an "approved alternate new
home warranty program." Id.
130. See id. § 46:3B-7. If the commissioner pays funds to an owner, then the com-
missioner has a right to proceed against the builder in accordance with § 46:3B-6 of the
Act. See id. § 46:3B-6.
131. See id. § 46:3B-4. See Kratchman v. Dimedio, 5 N.J.A.R. 202 (1981) (builder
liable under the Act for defects in the new home).
132. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3B-2(d)-(e) (West Supp. 1989) (emphasis added).
"'Owner' means any person for whom the new home is built or to whom the home is sold
for occupation by him or his family as a home and his successors in title to the home or
mortgagee in possession. . . .'New home' means any dwelling not previously occupied,
excluding dwelling units constructed solely for lease."). Id.
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cost of an insurance program would equal approximately .35%
of the sale price of new homes. Therefore, a house costing
$100,000 could be insured for approximately $360 - less than
the cost of automobile insurance. Also, insurance costs may be
lower depending upon a builder's experience, number of com-
plaints, years in business, and the cost of the home. Thus, an
established quality builder will be rewarded with lower rates and
increased competitiveness. Correspondingly, higher risk builders
will pay higher rates and become less competitive.133
V. CONCLUSION
The transition from caveat emptor to caveat venditor is not
yet complete. Courts have distinguished among new and used
homes; original and subsequent purchasers; economic and
noneconomic loss; and builder-vendors, builder-nonvendors and
nonbuilder-vendors. These distinctions demonstrate that all
home purchasers are not afforded adequate protection. Further-
more, the possibility of insolvent defendants poses a serious risk
to all home purchasers. These factors coupled with a competitive
housing market, in which the ultimate goal is low prices rather
than quality, create a climate ripe for noncompensated construc-
tion defects.
A mandatory home warranty program, such as the one pro-
posed or one similar to the New Jersey Act, would resolve many
of these concerns. Although purchasers ultimately would bear
the cost of these programs, they also would reap the bbnefits.
Although the programs certainly will not end all construction
defect related litigation, at least prevailing home owners would
be assured of recovery. While the courts eventually may address
many of these concerns, unless legislative action is undertaken,
other Homebuyers may experience the harsh inequities of the
current laws.
G. Scott Lutz
133. These cost estimates were obtained from the July 1, 1987, Fee Schedule of
HOW. The estimates do not include HOW's initial $200 fee, which is required of all
HOW builders.
1042 [Vol. 40
26
outh Carolina Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 10
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol40/iss4/10
